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Abstract
In information societies, operations, decisions and choices previously left to humans are increasingly delegated to
algorithms, which may advise, if not decide, about how data should be interpreted and what actions should be taken
as a result. More and more often, algorithms mediate social processes, business transactions, governmental decisions,
and how we perceive, understand, and interact among ourselves and with the environment. Gaps between the design and
operation of algorithms and our understanding of their ethical implications can have severe consequences affecting
individuals as well as groups and whole societies. This paper makes three contributions to clarify the ethical importance
of algorithmic mediation. It provides a prescriptive map to organise the debate. It reviews the current discussion of
ethical aspects of algorithms. And it assesses the available literature in order to identify areas requiring further work to
develop the ethics of algorithms.
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Introduction
In information societies, operations, decisions and
choices previously left to humans are increasingly dele-
gated to algorithms, which may advise, if not decide,
about how data should be interpreted and what actions
should be taken as a result.1 Examples abound.
Proﬁling and classiﬁcation algorithms determine how
individuals and groups are shaped and managed
(Floridi, 2012). Recommendation systems give users
directions about when and how to exercise, what to
buy, which route to take, and who to contact (Vries,
2010: 81). Data mining algorithms are said to show
promise in helping make sense of emerging streams of
behavioural data generated by the ‘Internet of Things’
(Portmess and Tower, 2014: 1). Online service providers
continue to mediate how information is accessed with
personalisation and ﬁltering algorithms (Newell and
Marabelli, 2015; Taddeo and Floridi, 2015). Machine
learning algorithms automatically identify misleading,
biased or inaccurate knowledge at the point of creation
(e.g. Wikipedia’s Objective Revision Evaluation
Service). As these examples suggest, how we perceive
and understand our environments and interact with
them and each other is increasingly mediated by
algorithms.
Algorithms are inescapably value-laden (Brey and
Soraker, 2009; Wiener, 1988). Operational parameters
are speciﬁed by developers and conﬁgured by users with
desired outcomes in mind that privilege some values
and interests over others (cf. Friedman and
Nissenbaum, 1996; Johnson, 2006; Kraemer et al.,
2011; Nakamura, 2013). At the same time, operation
within accepted parameters does not guarantee ethic-
ally acceptable behaviour. This is shown, for example,
by proﬁling algorithms that inadvertently discriminate
against marginalised populations (Barocas and Selbst,
1Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
2Alan Turing Institute, British Library, London, UK
Corresponding author:
Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford,
1 St Giles, Oxford OX1 3JS, UK.
Email: brent.mittelstadt@oii.ox.ac.uk
Big Data & Society
July–December 2016: 1–21
! The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2053951716679679
bds.sagepub.com
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction
and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
2015; Birrer, 2005), as seen in delivery of online
advertisements according to perceived ethnicity
(Sweeney, 2013).
Determining the potential and actual ethical impact
of an algorithm is diﬃcult for many reasons.
Identifying the inﬂuence of human subjectivity in algo-
rithm design and conﬁguration often requires investi-
gation of long-term, multi-user development processes.
Even with suﬃcient resources, problems and underlying
values will often not be apparent until a problematic
use case arises. Learning algorithms, often quoted as
the ‘future’ of algorithms and analytics (Tutt, 2016),
introduce uncertainty over how and why decisions are
made due to their capacity to tweak operational par-
ameters and decision-making rules ‘in the wild’
(Burrell, 2016). Determining whether a particular prob-
lematic decision is merely a one-oﬀ ‘bug’ or evidence of
a systemic failure or bias may be impossible (or at least
highly diﬃcult) with poorly interpretable and predict-
able learning algorithms. Such challenges are set to
grow, as algorithms increase in complexity and interact
with each other’s outputs to take decisions (Tutt, 2016).
The resulting gap between the design and operation of
algorithms and our understanding of their ethical impli-
cations can have severe consequences aﬀecting individ-
uals, groups and whole segments of a society.
In this paper, we map the ethical problems prompted
by algorithmic decision-making. The paper answers
two questions: what kinds of ethical issues are raised
by algorithms? And, how do these issues apply to algo-
rithms themselves, as opposed to technologies built
upon algorithms? We ﬁrst propose a conceptual map
based on six kinds of concerns that are jointly suﬃcient
for a principled organisation of the ﬁeld. We argue that
the map allows for a more rigorous diagnosis of ethical
challenges related to the use of algorithms. We then
review the scientiﬁc literature discussing ethical aspects
of algorithms to assess the utility and accuracy of the
proposed map. Seven themes emerged from the litera-
ture that demonstrate how the concerns deﬁned in the
proposed map arise in practice. Together, the map and
review provide a common structure for future discus-
sion of the ethics of algorithms. In the ﬁnal section of
the paper we assess the ﬁt between the proposed map
and themes currently raised in the reviewed literature to
identify areas of the ‘ethics of algorithms’ requiring
further research. The conceptual framework, review
and critical analysis oﬀered in this paper aim to
inform future ethical inquiry, development, and gov-
ernance of algorithms.
Background
To map the ethics of algorithms, we must ﬁrst deﬁne
some key terms. ‘Algorithm’ has an array of meanings
across computer science, mathematics and public
discourse. As Hill explains, ‘‘we see evidence that any
procedure or decision process, however ill-deﬁned,
can be called an ‘algorithm’ in the press and in
public discourse. We hear, in the news, of ‘algorithms’
that suggest potential mates for single people and
algorithms that detect trends of ﬁnancial beneﬁt to
marketers, with the implication that these algorithms
may be right or wrong. . .’’ (Hill, 2015: 36). Many
scholarly critiques also fail to specify technical cate-
gories or a formal deﬁnition of ‘algorithm’ (Burrell,
2016; Kitchin, 2016). In both cases the term is used
not in reference to the algorithm as a mathematical
construct, but rather the implementation and inter-
action of one or more algorithms in a particular pro-
gram, software or information system. Any attempt to
map an ‘ethics of algorithms’ must address this conﬂa-
tion between formal deﬁnitions and popular usage of
‘algorithm’.
Here, we follow Hill’s (2015: 47) formal deﬁnition of
an algorithm as a mathematical construct with ‘‘a ﬁnite,
abstract, eﬀective, compound control structure,
imperatively given, accomplishing a given purpose
under given provisions.’’ However, our investigation
will not be limited to algorithms as mathematical con-
structs. As suggested by the inclusion of ‘purpose’ and
‘provisions’ in Hill’s deﬁnition, algorithms must be
implemented and executed to take action and have
eﬀects. The popular usage of the term becomes relevant
here. References to algorithms in public discourse do
not normally address algorithms as mathematical con-
structs, but rather particular implementations. Lay
usage of ‘algorithm’ also includes implementation of
the mathematical construct into a technology, and an
application of the technology conﬁgured for a particular
task.2 A fully conﬁgured algorithm will incorporate the
abstract mathematical structure that has been imple-
mented into a system for analysis of tasks in a particu-
lar analytic domain. Given this clariﬁcation, the
conﬁguration of an algorithm to a speciﬁc task or data-
set does not change its underlying mathematical repre-
sentation or system implementation; it is rather a
further tweaking of the algorithm’s operation in rela-
tion to a speciﬁc case or problem.
Accordingly, it makes little sense to consider the
ethics of algorithms independent of how they are imple-
mented and executed in computer programs, software
and information systems. Our aim here is to map the
ethics of algorithms, with ‘algorithm’ interpreted along
public discourse lines. Our map will include ethical
issues arising from algorithms as mathematical con-
structs, implementations (technologies, programs) and
conﬁgurations (applications).3 Where discussion
focuses on implementations or conﬁgurations (i.e. an
artefact with an embedded algorithm), we limit our
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focus to issues relating to the algorithm’s work, rather
than all issues related to the artefact.
However, as noted by Hill above, a problem with the
popular usage of ‘algorithm’ is that it can describe ‘‘any
procedure or decision process,’’ resulting in a prohibi-
tively large range of artefacts to account for in a map-
ping exercise. Public discourse is currently dominated
by concerns with a particular class of algorithms that
make decisions, e.g. the best action to take in a given
situation, the best interpretation of data, and so on.
Such algorithms augment or replace analysis and deci-
sion-making by humans, often due to the scope or scale
of data and rules involved. Without oﬀering a precise
deﬁnition of the class, the algorithms we are interested
in here are those that make generally reliable (but sub-
jective and not necessarily correct) decisions based
upon complex rules that challenge or confound
human capacities for action and comprehension.4 In
other words, we are interested in algorithms whose
actions are diﬃcult for humans to predict or whose
decision-making logic is diﬃcult to explain after the
fact. Algorithms that automate mundane tasks, for
instance in manufacturing, are not our concern.
Decision-making algorithms are used across a var-
iety of domains, from simplistic decision-making
models (Levenson and Pettrey, 1994) to complex proﬁl-
ing algorithms (Hildebrandt, 2008). Notable contem-
porary examples include online software agents used
by online service providers to carry out operations on
the behalf of users (Kim et al., 2014); online dispute
resolution algorithms that replace human decision-
makers in dispute mediation (Raymond, 2014;
Shackelford and Raymond, 2014); recommendation
and ﬁltering systems that compare and group users to
provide personalised content (Barnet, 2009); clinical
decision support systems (CDSS) that recommend diag-
noses and treatments to physicians (Diamond et al.,
1987; Mazoue´, 1990); and predictive policing systems
that predict criminal activity hotspots.
The discipline of data analytics is a standout exam-
ple, deﬁned here as the practice of using algorithms to
make sense of streams of data. Analytics informs imme-
diate responses to the needs and preferences of the users
of a system, as well as longer term strategic planning
and development by a platform or service provider
(Grindrod, 2014). Analytics identiﬁes relationships
and small patterns across vast and distributed datasets
(Floridi, 2012). New types of enquiry are enabled,
including behavioural research on ‘scraped’ data (e.g.
Lomborg and Bechmann, 2014: 256); tracking of ﬁne-
grained behaviours and preferences (e.g. sexual orien-
tation or political opinions; (Mahajan et al., 2012);
and prediction of future behaviour (as used in predict-
ive policing or credit, insurance and employment
screening; Zarsky, 2016). Actionable insights (more on
this later) are sought rather than causal relationships
(Grindrod, 2014; Hildebrandt, 2011; Johnson, 2013).
Analytics demonstrates how algorithms can chal-
lenge human decision-making and comprehension
even for tasks previously performed by humans. In
making a decision (for instance, which risk class a pur-
chaser of insurance belongs to), analytics algorithms
work with high-dimension data to determine which fea-
tures are relevant to a given decision. The number of
features considered in any such classiﬁcation task can
run into the tens of thousands. This type of task is thus
a replication of work previously undertaken by human
workers (i.e. risk stratiﬁcation), but involving a quali-
tatively diﬀerent decision-making logic applied to
greater inputs.
Algorithms are, however, ethically challenging not
only because of the scale of analysis and complexity
of decision-making. The uncertainty and opacity of
the work being done by algorithms and its impact is
also increasingly problematic. Algorithms have trad-
itionally required decision-making rules and weights
to be individually deﬁned and programmed ‘by hand’.
While still true in many cases (Google’s PageRank
algorithm is a standout example), algorithms increas-
ingly rely on learning capacities (Tutt, 2016).
Machine learning is ‘‘any methodology and set of
techniques that can employ data to come up with
novel patterns and knowledge, and generate models
that can be used for eﬀective predictions about the
data’’ (Van Otterlo, 2013). Machine learning is deﬁned
by the capacity to deﬁne or modify decision-making
rules autonomously. A machine learning algorithm
applied to classiﬁcation tasks, for example, typically
consists of two components, a learner which produces
a classiﬁer, with the intention to develop classes that
can generalise beyond the training data (Domingos,
2012). The algorithm’s work involves placing new
inputs into a model or classiﬁcation structure. Image
recognition technologies, for example, can decide what
types of objects appear in a picture. The algorithm
‘learns’ by deﬁning rules to determine how new inputs
will be classiﬁed. The model can be taught to the algo-
rithm via hand labelled inputs (supervised learning); in
other cases the algorithm itself deﬁnes best-ﬁt models to
make sense of a set of inputs (unsupervised learning)5
(Schermer, 2011; Van Otterlo, 2013). In both cases, the
algorithm deﬁnes decision-making rules to handle new
inputs. Critically, the human operator does not need to
understand the rationale of decision-making rules
produced by the algorithm (Matthias, 2004: 179).
As this explanation suggests, learning capacities
grant algorithms some degree of autonomy.
The impact of this autonomy must remain uncertain
to some degree. As a result, tasks performed by
machine learning are diﬃcult to predict beforehand
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(how a new input will be handled) or explain afterwards
(how a particular decision was made). Uncertainty can
thus inhibit the identiﬁcation and redress of ethical
challenges in the design and operation of algorithms.
Map of the ethics of algorithms
Using the key terms deﬁned in the previous section, we
propose a conceptual map (Figure 1) based on six types
of concerns that are jointly suﬃcient for a principled
organisation of the ﬁeld, and conjecture that it allows
for a more rigorous diagnosis of ethical challenges
related to the use of algorithms. The map is not pro-
posed from a particular theoretical or methodological
approach to ethics, but rather is intended as a prescrip-
tive framework of types of issues arising from algo-
rithms owing to three aspects of how algorithms
operate. The map takes into account that the algo-
rithms this paper is concerned with are used to (1)
turn data into evidence for a given outcome (henceforth
conclusion), and that this outcome is then used to (2)
trigger andmotivate an action that (on its own, or when
combined with other actions) may not be ethically neu-
tral. This work is performed in ways that are complex
and (semi-)autonomous, which (3) complicates appor-
tionment of responsibility for eﬀects of actions driven
by algorithms. The map is thus not intended as a tool to
help solve ethical dilemmas arising from problematic
actions driven by algorithms, but rather is posed as
an organising structure based on how algorithms oper-
ate that can structure future discussion of ethical issues.
This leads us to posit three epistemic, and two norma-
tive kinds of ethical concerns arising from the use of
algorithms, based on how algorithms process data to
produce evidence and motivate actions. These concerns
are associated with potential failures that may involve
multiple actors, and therefore complicate the question
of who should be held responsible and/or accountable
for such failures. Such diﬃculties motivate the addition
of traceability as a ﬁnal, overarching, concern.
Inconclusive evidence
When algorithms draw conclusions from the data they
process using inferential statistics and/or machine
learning techniques, they produce probable6 yet inevit-
ably uncertain knowledge. Statistical learning theory
(James et al., 2013) and computational learning
theory (Valiant, 1984) are both concerned with the
characterisation and quantiﬁcation of this uncertainty.
In addition to this, and as often indicated, statistical
methods can help identify signiﬁcant correlations, but
these are rarely considered to be suﬃcient to posit the
existence of a causal connection (Illari and Russo, 2014:
Chapter 8), and thus may be insuﬃcient to motivate
action on the basis of knowledge of such a connection.
The term actionable insight we mentioned earlier can be
seen as an explicit recognition of these epistemic
limitations.
Algorithms are typically deployed in contexts where
more reliable techniques are either not available or too
costly to implement, and are thus rarely meant to be
infallible. Recognising this limitation is important, but
should be complemented with an assessment of how the
risk of being wrong aﬀects one’s epistemic responsibil-
ities (Miller and Record, 2013): for instance, by
weakening the justiﬁcation one has for a conclusion
beyond what would be deemed acceptable to justify
action in the context at hand.
Inscrutable evidence
When data are used as (or processed to produce) evi-
dence for a conclusion, it is reasonable to expect that the
connection between the data and the conclusion should
be accessible (i.e. intelligible as well as open to scrutiny
and perhaps even critique).7 When the connection is not
obvious, this expectation can be satisﬁed by better access
as well as by additional explanations. Given how algo-
rithms operate, these requirements are not automatically
satisﬁed. A lack of knowledge regarding the data being
used (e.g. relating to their scope, provenance and qual-
ity), but more importantly also the inherent diﬃculty in
the interpretation of how each of the many data-points
used by a machine-learning algorithm contribute to the
conclusion it generates, cause practical as well as prin-
cipled limitations (Miller and Record, 2013).
Misguided evidence
Algorithms process data and are therefore subject to a
limitation shared by all types of data-processing,
namely that the output can never exceed the input.Figure 1. Six types of ethical concerns raised by algorithms.
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While Shannon’s mathematical theory of communica-
tion (Shannon and Weaver, 1998), and especially some
of his information-inequalities, give a formally precise
account of this fact, the informal ‘garbage in, garbage
out’ principle clearly illustrates what is at stake here,
namely that conclusions can only be as reliable (but
also as neutral) as the data they are based on.
Evaluations of the neutrality of the process, and by
connection whether the evidence produced is mis-
guided, are of course observer-dependent.
Unfair outcomes
The three epistemic concerns detailed thus far address
the quality of evidence produced by an algorithm that
motivates a particular action. However, ethical evalu-
ation of algorithms can also focus solely on the action
itself. Actions driven by algorithms can be assessed
according to numerous ethical criteria and principles,
which we generically refer to here as the observer-
dependent ‘fairness’ of the action and its eﬀects. An
action can be found discriminatory, for example,
solely from its eﬀect on a protected class of people,
even if made on the basis of conclusive, scrutable and
well-founded evidence.
Transformative effects
The ethical challenges posed by the spreading use
of algorithms cannot always be retraced to clear cases
of epistemic or ethical failures, for some of the eﬀects of
the reliance on algorithmic data-processing and (semi-)
autonomous decision-making can be questionable and
yet appear ethically neutral because they do not seem to
cause any obvious harm. This is because algorithms can
aﬀect how we conceptualise the world, and modify its
social and political organisation (cf. Floridi, 2014).
Algorithmic activities, like proﬁling, reontologise the
world by understanding and conceptualising it in new,
unexpected ways, and triggering and motivating actions
based on the insights it generates.
Traceability
Algorithms are software-artefacts used in data-proces-
sing, and as such inherit the ethical challenges asso-
ciated with the design and availability of new
technologies and those associated with the manipula-
tion of large volumes of personal and other data. This
implies that harm caused by algorithmic activity is hard
to debug (i.e. to detect the harm and ﬁnd its cause), but
also that it is rarely straightforward to identify who
should be held responsible for the harm caused.8
When a problem is identiﬁed addressing any or all of
the ﬁve preceding kinds, ethical assessment requires
both the cause and responsibility for the harm to be
traced.
Thanks to this map (Figure 1), we are now able to
distinguish epistemological, strictly ethical and traceabil-
ity types in descriptions of ethical problems with algo-
rithms. The map is thus intended as a tool to organise a
widely dispersed academic discourse addressing a diver-
sity of technologies united by their reliance on algo-
rithms. To assess the utility of the map, and to observe
how each of these kinds of concerns manifests in ethical
problems already observed in algorithms, a systematic
review of academic literature was carried out.9 The fol-
lowing sections (4 to 10) describe how ethical issues and
concepts are treated in the literature explicitly discussing
the ethical aspects of algorithms.
Inconclusive evidence leading to
unjustified actions
Much algorithmic decision-making and data mining
relies on inductive knowledge and correlations identi-
ﬁed within a dataset. Causality is not established prior
to acting upon the evidence produced by the algorithm.
The search for causal links is diﬃcult, as correlations
established in large, proprietary datasets are frequently
not reproducible or falsiﬁable (cf. Ioannidis, 2005;
Lazer et al., 2014). Despite this, correlations based on
a suﬃcient volume of data are increasingly seen as suf-
ﬁciently credible to direct action without ﬁrst establish-
ing causality (Hildebrandt, 2011; Hildebrandt and
Koops, 2010; Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier, 2013;
Zarsky, 2016). In this sense data mining and proﬁling
algorithms often need only establish a suﬃciently reli-
able evidence base to drive action, referred to here as
actionable insights.
Acting on correlations can be doubly problematic.10
Spurious correlations may be discovered rather than
genuine causal knowledge. In predictive analytics cor-
relations are doubly uncertain (Ananny, 2016). Even if
strong correlations or causal knowledge are found, this
knowledge may only concern populations while actions
are directed towards individuals (Illari and Russo,
2014). As Ananny (2016: 103) explains, ‘‘algorithmic
categories . . . signal certainty, discourage alternative
explorations, and create coherence among disparate
objects,’’ all of which contribute to individuals being
described (possibly inaccurately) via simpliﬁed models
or classes (Barocas, 2014). Finally, even if both actions
and knowledge are at the population-level, our actions
may spill over into the individual level. For example,
this happens when an insurance premium is set for a
sub-population, and hence has to be paid by each
member. Actions taken on the basis of inductive cor-
relations have real impact on human interests inde-
pendent of their validity.
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Inscrutable evidence leading to opacity
The scrutability of evidence, evaluated in terms of the
transparency or opacity of algorithms, proved a major
concern in the reviewed literature. Transparency is gen-
erally desired because algorithms that are poorly pre-
dictable or explainable are diﬃcult to control, monitor
and correct (Tutt, 2016). As many critics have observed
(Crawford, 2016; Neyland, 2016; Raymond, 2014),
transparency is often naı¨vely treated as a panacea for
ethical issues arising from new technologies.
Transparency is generally deﬁned with respect to ‘‘the
availability of information, the conditions of accessibil-
ity and how the information . . . may pragmatically or
epistemically support the user’s decision-making pro-
cess’’ (Turilli and Floridi, 2009: 106). The debate on
this topic is not new. The literature in information
and computer ethics, for example started to focus on
it at the beginning of the 21st century, when issues con-
cerning algorithmic information ﬁltering by search
engines arose.11
The primary components of transparency are acces-
sibility and comprehensibility of information.
Information about the functionality of algorithms is
often intentionally poorly accessible. Proprietary algo-
rithms are kept secret for the sake of competitive
advantage (Glenn and Monteith, 2014; Kitchin, 2016;
Stark and Fins, 2013), national security (Leese, 2014),
or privacy. Transparency can thus run counter to other
ethical ideals, in particular the privacy of data subjects
and autonomy of organisations.
Granka (2010) notes a power struggle between data
subjects’ interests in transparency and data processors’
commercial viability. Disclosing the structure of these
algorithms would facilitate ill-intentioned manipula-
tions of search results (or ‘gaming the system’), while
not bringing any advantage to the average non-tech-
savvy user (Granka, 2010; Zarsky, 2016). The commer-
cial viability of data processors in many industries (e.g.
credit reporting, high frequency trading) may be threa-
tened by transparency. However, data subjects retain
an interest in understanding how information about
them is created and inﬂuences decisions taken in data-
driven practices. This struggle is marked by informa-
tion asymmetry and an ‘‘imbalance in knowledge and
decision-making power’’ favouring data processors
(Tene and Polonetsky, 2013a: 252).
Besides being accessible, information must be com-
prehensible to be considered transparent (Turilli and
Floridi, 2009). Eﬀorts to make algorithms transparent
face a signiﬁcant challenge to render complex decision-
making processes both accessible and comprehensible.
The longstanding problem of interpretability in
machine learning algorithms indicates the challenge of
opacity in algorithms (Burrell, 2016; Hildebrandt, 2011;
Leese, 2014; Tutt, 2016). Machine learning is adept at
creating and modifying rules to classify or cluster large
datasets. The algorithm modiﬁes its behavioural struc-
ture during operation (Markowetz et al., 2014). This
alteration of how the algorithm classiﬁes new inputs
is how it learns (Burrell, 2016: 5). Training produces a
structure (e.g. classes, clusters, ranks, weights, etc.) to
classify new inputs or predict unknown variables. Once
trained, new data can be processed and categorised
automatically without operator intervention (Leese,
2014). The rationale of the algorithm is obscured, lend-
ing to the portrayal of machine learning algorithms as
‘black boxes’.
Burrell (2016) and Schermer (2011) argue that the
opacity of machine learning algorithms inhibits over-
sight. Algorithms ‘‘are opaque in the sense that if one
is a recipient of the output of the algorithm (the clas-
siﬁcation decision), rarely does one have any concrete
sense of how or why a particular classiﬁcation has
been arrived at from inputs’’ (Burrell, 2016: 1). Both
the inputs (data about humans) and outputs (classiﬁ-
cations) can be unknown and unknowable. Opacity in
machine learning algorithms is a product of the high-
dimensionality of data, complex code and changeable
decision-making logic (Burrell, 2016). Matthias (2004:
179) suggests that machine learning can produce out-
puts for which ‘‘the human trainer himself is unable to
provide an algorithmic representation.’’ Algorithms
can only be considered explainable to the degree
that a human can articulate the trained model or
rationale of a particular decision, for instance by
explaining the (quantiﬁed) inﬂuence of particular
inputs or attributes (Datta et al., 2016). Meaningful
oversight and human intervention in algorithmic deci-
sion-making ‘‘is impossible when the machine has an
informational advantage over the operator . . . [or]
when the machine cannot be controlled by a human
in real-time due to its processing speed and the multi-
tude of operational variables’’ (Matthias, 2004: 182–
183). This is, one again, the black box problem.
However, a distinction should be drawn, between the
technical infeasibility of oversight and practical bar-
riers caused, for instance, by a lack of expertise,
access, or resources.
Beyond machine learning, algorithms with ‘hand-
written’ decision-making rules can still be highly
complex and practically inscrutable from a lay data
subject’s perspective (Kitchin, 2016). Algorithmic deci-
sion-making structures containing ‘‘hundreds of rules
are very hard to inspect visually, especially when their
predictions are combined probabilistically in complex
ways’’ (Van Otterlo, 2013). Further, algorithms are
often developed by large teams of engineers over
time, with a holistic understanding of the development
process and its embedded values, biases and
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interdependencies rendered infeasible (Sandvig et al.,
2014). In both respects, algorithmic processing con-
trasts with traditional decision-making, where human
decision-makers can in principle articulate their ration-
ale when queried, limited only by their desire and
capacity to give an explanation, and the questioner’s
capacity to understand it. The rationale of an algo-
rithm can in contrast be incomprehensible to humans,
rendering the legitimacy of decisions diﬃcult to
challenge.
Under these conditions, decision-making is poorly
transparent. Rubel and Jones (2014) argue that the fail-
ure to render the processing logic comprehensible to
data subject’s disrespects their agency (we shall return
to this point in Section 8). Meaningful consent to data-
processing is not possible when opacity precludes risk
assessment (Schermer, 2011). Releasing information
about the algorithm’s decision-making logic in a sim-
pliﬁed format can help (Datta et al., 2016; Tene and
Polonetsky, 2013a). However, complex decision-
making structures can quickly exceed the human and
organisational resources available for oversight
(Kitchin, 2016). As a result, lay data subjects may
lose trust in both algorithms and data processors
(Cohen et al., 2014; Rubel and Jones, 2014;
Shackelford and Raymond, 2014).12
Even if data processors and controllers disclose
operational information, the net beneﬁt for society is
uncertain. A lack of public engagement with existing
transparency mechanisms reﬂects this uncertainty,
seen for example in credit scoring (Zarsky, 2016).
Transparency disclosures may prove more impactful if
tailored towards trained third parties or regulators rep-
resenting public interest as opposed to data subjects
themselves (Tutt, 2016; Zarsky, 2013).
Transparency disclosures by data processors and
controllers may prove crucial in the future to maintain
a trusting relationship with data subjects (Cohen et al.,
2014; Rubel and Jones, 2014; Shackelford and
Raymond, 2014). Trust implies the trustor’s (the
agent who trusts) expectations for the trustee (the
agent who is trusted) to perform a task (Taddeo,
2010), and acceptance of the risk that the trustee will
betray these expectations (Wiegel and Berg, 2009).
Trust in data processors can, for instance, alleviate con-
cerns with opaque personal data-processing (Mazoue´,
1990). However, trust can also exist among artiﬁcial
agents exclusively, seen for instance in the agents of a
distributed system working cooperatively to achieve a
given goal (Grodzinsky et al., 2010; Simon, 2010;
Taddeo, 2010). Furthermore, algorithms can be per-
ceived as trustworthy independently of (or perhaps
even despite) any trust placed in the data processor;
yet the question of when this may be appropriate
remains open.13
Misguided evidence leading to bias
The automation of human decision-making is often
justiﬁed by an alleged lack of bias in algorithms
(Bozdag, 2013; Naik and Bhide, 2014). This belief is
unsustainable, as shown by prior work demonstrating
the normativity of information technologies in general
and algorithm development in particular14 (e.g.
Bozdag, 2013; Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996;
Kraemer et al., 2011; Macnish, 2012; Newell and
Marabelli, 2015: 6; Tene and Polonetsky, 2013b).
Much of the reviewed literature addresses how bias
manifests in algorithms and the evidence they produce.
Algorithms inevitably make biased decisions. An
algorithm’s design and functionality reﬂects the values
of its designer and intended uses, if only to the extent
that a particular design is preferred as the best or most
eﬃcient option. Development is not a neutral, linear
path; there is no objectively correct choice at any
given stage of development, but many possible choices
(Johnson, 2006). As a result, ‘‘the values of the author
[of an algorithm], wittingly or not, are frozen into the
code, eﬀectively institutionalising those values’’
(Macnish, 2012: 158). It is diﬃcult to detect latent
bias in algorithms and the models they produce when
encountered in isolation of the algorithm’s develop-
ment history (Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996;
Hildebrandt, 2011; Morek, 2006).
Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996) argue that bias
can arise from (1) pre-existing social values found in
the ‘‘social institutions, practices and attitudes’’ from
which the technology emerges, (2) technical constraints
and (3) emergent aspects of a context of use. Social
biases can be embedded in system design purposefully
by individual designers, seen for instance in manual
adjustments to search engine indexes and ranking
criteria (Goldman, 2006). Social bias can also be unin-
tentional, a subtle reﬂection of broader cultural
or organisational values. For example, machine learn-
ing algorithms trained from human-tagged data inad-
vertently learn to reﬂect biases of the taggers
(Diakopoulos, 2015).
Technical bias arises from technological constraints,
errors or design decisions, which favour particular
groups without an underlying driving value
(Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996). Examples include
when an alphabetical listing of airline companies leads
to increase business for those earlier in the alphabet, or
an error in the design of a random number generator
that causes particular numbers to be favoured. Errors
can similarly manifest in the datasets processed by algo-
rithms. Flaws in the data are inadvertently adopted
by the algorithm and hidden in outputs and models
produced (Barocas and Selbst, 2015; Romei and
Ruggieri, 2014).
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Emergent bias is linked with advances in knowledge
or changes to the system’s (intended) users and stake-
holders (Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996). For exam-
ple, CDSS are unavoidably biased towards treatments
included in their decision architecture. Although emer-
gent bias is linked to the user, it can emerge unexpect-
edly from decisional rules developed by the algorithm,
rather than any ‘hand-written’ decision-making struc-
ture (Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer, 2013; Kamiran and
Calders, 2010). Human monitoring may prevent some
biases from entering algorithmic decision-making in
these cases (Raymond, 2014).
The outputs of algorithms also require interpretation
(i.e. what one should do based on what the algorithm
indicates); for behavioural data, ‘objective’ correlations
can come to reﬂect the interpreter’s ‘‘unconscious
motivations, particular emotions, deliberate choices,
socio-economic determinations, geographic or demo-
graphic inﬂuences’’ (Hildebrandt, 2011: 376).
Explaining the correlation in any of these terms
requires additional justiﬁcation – meaning is not self-
evident in statistical models. Diﬀerent metrics ‘‘make
visible aspects of individuals and groups that are not
otherwise perceptible’’ (Lupton, 2014: 859). It thus
cannot be assumed that an observer’s interpretation
will correctly reﬂect the perception of the actor rather
than the biases of the interpreter.
Unfair outcomes leading to
discrimination
Much of the reviewed literature also addresses how dis-
crimination results from biased evidence and decision-
making.15 Proﬁling by algorithms, broadly deﬁned ‘‘as
the construction or inference of patterns by means of
data mining and . . . the application of the ensuing pro-
ﬁles to people whose data match with them’’
(Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010: 431), is frequently
cited as a source of discrimination. Proﬁling algorithms
identify correlations and make predictions about
behaviour at a group-level, albeit with groups (or pro-
ﬁles) that are constantly changing and re-deﬁned by the
algorithm (Zarsky, 2013). Whether dynamic or static,
the individual is comprehended based on connections
with others identiﬁed by the algorithm, rather than
actual behaviour (Newell and Marabelli, 2015: 5).
Individuals’ choices are structured according to infor-
mation about the group (Danna and Gandy, 2002:
382). Proﬁling can inadvertently create an evidence-
base that leads to discrimination (Vries, 2010).
For the aﬀected parties, data-driven discriminatory
treatment is unlikely to be more palatable than discrim-
ination fuelled by prejudices or anecdotal evidence.
This much is implicit in Schermer’s (2011) argument
that discriminatory treatment is not ethically problem-
atic in itself; rather, it is the eﬀects of the treatment that
determine its ethical acceptability. However, Schermer
muddles bias and discrimination into a single concept.
What he terms discrimination can be described instead
as mere bias, or the consistent and repeated expression
of a particular preference, belief or value in decision-
making (Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996). In contrast,
what he describes as problematic eﬀects of discrimin-
atory treatment can be deﬁned as discrimination tout
court. So bias is a dimension of the decision-making
itself, whereas discrimination describes the eﬀects of a
decision, in terms of adverse disproportionate impact
resulting from algorithmic decision-making. Barocas
and Selbst (2015) show that precisely this deﬁnition
guides ‘disparate impact detection’, an enforcement
mechanism for American anti-discrimination law in
areas such as social housing and employment. They
suggest that disparate impact detection provides a
model for the detection of bias and discrimination in
algorithmic decision-making which is sensitive to diﬀer-
ential privacy.
It may be possible to direct algorithms not to consider
sensitive attributes that contribute to discrimination
(Barocas and Selbst, 2015), such as gender or ethnicity
(Calders et al., 2009; Kamiran and Calders, 2010;
Schermer, 2011), based upon the emergence of discrim-
ination in a particular context. However, proxies for
protected attributes are not easy to predict or detect
(Romei and Ruggieri, 2014; Zarsky, 2016), particularly
when algorithms access linked datasets (Barocas and
Selbst, 2015). Proﬁles constructed from neutral charac-
teristics such as postal code may inadvertently overlap
with other proﬁles related to ethnicity, gender, sexual
preference, and so on (Macnish, 2012; Schermer, 2011).
Eﬀorts are underway to avoid such ‘redlining’ by
sensitive attributes and proxies. Romei and Ruggieri
(2014) observe four overlapping strategies for discrim-
ination prevention in analytics: (1) controlled distortion
of training data; (2) integration of anti-discrimination
criteria into the classiﬁer algorithm; (3) post-processing
of classiﬁcation models; (4) modiﬁcation of predictions
and decisions to maintain a fair proportion of eﬀects
between protected and unprotected groups. These
strategies are seen in the development of privacy-
preserving, fairness- and discrimination-aware data
mining (Dwork et al., 2011; Kamishima et al., 2012).
Fairness-aware data mining takes the broadest aim, as
it gives attention not only to discrimination but fair-
ness, neutrality, and independence as well (Kamishima
et al., 2012). Various metrics of fairness are possible
based on statistical parity, diﬀerential privacy and
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other relations between data subjects in classiﬁcation
tasks (Dwork et al., 2011; Romei and Ruggieri, 2014).
The related practice of personalisation is also
frequently discussed. Personalisation can segment
a population so that only some segments are worthy
of receiving some opportunities or information,
re-enforcing existing social (dis)advantages. Questions
of the fairness and equitability of such practices are
often raised (e.g. Cohen et al., 2014; Danna and
Gandy, 2002; Rubel and Jones, 2014). Personalised pri-
cing, for example, can be ‘‘an invitation to leave
quietly’’ issued to data subjects deemed to lack value
or the capacity to pay.16
Reasons to consider discriminatory eﬀects as adverse
and thus ethically problematically are diverse.
Discriminatory analytics can contribute to self-fulﬁlling
prophecies and stigmatisation in targeted groups,
undermining their autonomy and participation in soci-
ety (Barocas, 2014; Leese, 2014; Macnish, 2012).
Personalisation through non-distributive proﬁling,
seen for example in personalised pricing in insurance
premiums (Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010; Van Wel
and Royakkers, 2004), can be discriminatory by violat-
ing both ethical and legal principles of equal or fair
treatment of individuals (Newell and Marabelli,
2015). Further, as described above the capacity of indi-
viduals to investigate the personal relevance of factors
used in decision-making is inhibited by opacity and
automation (Zarsky, 2016).
Transformative effects leading
to challenges for autonomy
Value-laden decisions made by algorithms can also
pose a threat to the autonomy of data subjects. The
reviewed literature in particular connects personalisa-
tion algorithms to these threats. Personalisation can be
deﬁned as the construction of choice architectures
which are not the same across a sample (Tene and
Polonetsky, 2013a). Similar to explicitly persuasive
technologies, algorithms can nudge the behaviour of
data subjects and human decision-makers by ﬁltering
information (Ananny, 2016). Diﬀerent content, infor-
mation, prices, etc. are oﬀered to groups or classes of
people within a population according to a particular
attribute, e.g. the ability to pay.
Personalisation algorithms tread a ﬁne line between
supporting and controlling decisions by ﬁltering which
information is presented to the user based upon in-
depth understanding of preferences, behaviours, and
perhaps vulnerabilities to inﬂuence (Bozdag, 2013;
Goldman, 2006; Newell and Marabelli, 2015; Zarsky,
2016). Classiﬁcations and streams of behavioural data
are used to match information to the interests and attri-
butes of data subjects. The subject’s autonomy in deci-
sion-making is disrespected when the desired choice
reﬂects third party interests above the individual’s
(Applin and Fischer, 2015; Stark and Fins, 2013).
This situation is somewhat paradoxical. In prin-
ciple, personalisation should improve decision-
making by providing the subject with only relevant
information when confronted with a potential infor-
mation overload; however, deciding which informa-
tion is relevant is inherently subjective. The subject
can be pushed to make the ‘‘institutionally preferred
action rather than their own preference’’ (Johnson,
2013); online consumers, for example, can be nudged
to ﬁt market needs by ﬁltering how products are
displayed (Coll, 2013). Lewis and Westlund
(2015: 14) suggest that personalisation algorithms
need to be taught to ‘act ethically’ to strike a balance
between coercing and supporting users’ decisional
autonomy.
Personalisation algorithms reduce the diversity of
information users encounter by excluding content
deemed irrelevant or contradictory to the user’s beliefs
(Barnet, 2009; Pariser, 2011). Information diversity can
thus be considered an enabling condition for autonomy
(van den Hoven and Rooksby, 2008). Filtering algo-
rithms that create ‘echo chambers’ devoid of contra-
dictory information may impede decisional autonomy
(Newell and Marabelli, 2015). Algorithms may be
unable to replicate the ‘‘spontaneous discovery of new
things, ideas and options’’ which appear as anomalies
against a subject’s proﬁled interests (Raymond, 2014).
With near ubiquitous access to information now feas-
ible in the internet age, issues of access concern whether
the ‘right’ information can be accessed, rather than any
information at all. Control over personalisation and
ﬁltering mechanisms can enhance user autonomy, but
potentially at the cost of information diversity (Bozdag,
2013). Personalisation algorithms, and the underlying
practice of analytics, can thus both enhance and under-
mine the agency of data subjects.
Transformative effects leading to
challenges for informational privacy
Algorithms are also driving a transformation of notions
of privacy. Responses to discrimination, de-individua-
lisation and the threats of opaque decision-making for
data subjects’ agency often appeal to informational
privacy (Schermer, 2011), or the right of data subjects
to ‘‘shield personal data from third parties.’’
Informational privacy concerns the capacity of an indi-
vidual to control information about herself (Van Wel
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and Royakkers, 2004), and the eﬀort required by third
parties to obtain this information.
A right to identity derived from informational
privacy interests suggests that opaque or secretive pro-
ﬁling is problematic.17 Opaque decision-making by
algorithms (see ‘Inconclusive evidence leading to unjus-
tiﬁed actions’ section) inhibits oversight and informed
decision-making concerning data sharing (Kim et al.,
2014). Data subjects cannot deﬁne privacy norms to
govern all types of data generically because their
value or insightfulness is only established through
processing (Hildebrandt, 2011; Van Wel and
Royakkers, 2004).
Beyond opacity, privacy protections based upon
identiﬁability are poorly suited to limit external man-
agement of identity via analytics. Identity is increas-
ingly inﬂuenced by knowledge produced through
analytics that makes sense of growing streams of behav-
ioural data. The ‘identiﬁable individual’ is not necessar-
ily a part of these processes. Schermer (2011) argues
that informational privacy is an inadequate conceptual
framework because proﬁling makes the identiﬁability of
data subjects irrelevant.
Proﬁling seeks to assemble individuals into mean-
ingful groups, for which identity is irrelevant (Floridi,
2012; Hildebrandt, 2011; Leese, 2014). Van Wel and
Royakkers (2004: 133) argue that external identity
construction by algorithms is a type of de-individuali-
sation, or a ‘‘tendency of judging and treating people
on the basis of group characteristics instead of on
their own individual characteristics and merit.’’
Individuals need never be identiﬁed when the proﬁle
is assembled to be aﬀected by the knowledge and
actions derived from it (Louch et al., 2010: 4).
The individual’s informational identity (Floridi,
2011) is breached by meaning generated by algo-
rithms that link the subject to others within a dataset
(Vries, 2010).
Current regulatory protections similarly struggle to
address the informational privacy risks of analytics.
‘Personal data’ is deﬁned in European data protection
law as data describing an identiﬁable person; anon-
ymised and aggregated data are not considered perso-
nal data (European Commission, 2012). Privacy
preserving data mining techniques which do not require
access to individual and identiﬁable records may miti-
gate these risks (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000; Fule and
Roddick, 2004). Others suggest a mechanism to ‘opt-
out’ of proﬁling for a particular purpose or context
would help protect data subjects’ privacy interests
(Hildebrandt, 2011; Rubel and Jones, 2014). A lack of
recourse mechanisms for data subjects to question the
validity of algorithmic decisions further exacerbates the
challenges of controlling identity and data about one-
self (Schermer, 2011). In response, Hildebrandt and
Koops (2010) call for ‘smart transparency’ by designing
the socio-technical infrastructures responsible for pro-
ﬁling in a way that allows individuals to anticipate and
respond to how they are proﬁled.
Traceability leading to moral
responsibility
When a technology fails, blame and sanctions must be
apportioned. One or more of the technology’s designer
(or developer), manufacturer or user are typically
held accountable. Designers and users of algorithms
are typically blamed when problems arise (Kraemer
et al., 2011: 251). Blame can only be justiﬁably attrib-
uted when the actor has some degree of control
(Matthias, 2004) and intentionality in carrying out the
action.
Traditionally, computer programmers have had
‘‘control of the behaviour of the machine in every
detail’’ insofar as they can explain its design and func-
tion to a third party (Matthias, 2004). This traditional
conception of responsibility in software design assumes
the programmer can reﬂect on the technology’s likely
eﬀects and potential for malfunctioning (Floridi et al.,
2014), and make design choices to choose the most
desirable outcomes according to the functional speciﬁ-
cation (Matthias, 2004). With that said, programmers
may only retain control in principle due to the complex-
ity and volume of code (Sandvig et al., 2014), and the
use of external libraries often treated by the program-
mer as ‘black boxes’ (cf. Note 7).
Superﬁcially, the traditional, linear conception of
responsibility is suitable to non-learning algorithms.
When decision-making rules are ‘hand-written’, their
authors retain responsibility (Bozdag, 2013). Decision-
making rules determine the relative weight given to the
variables or dimensions of the data considered by the
algorithm. A popular example is Facebook’s EdgeRank
personalisation algorithm, which prioritises content
based on date of publication, frequency of interaction
between author and reader, media type, and other
dimensions. Altering the relative importance of each
factor changes the relationships users are encouraged
to maintain. The party that sets conﬁdence intervals for
an algorithm’s decision-making structure shares
responsibility for the eﬀects of the resultant false posi-
tives, false negatives and spurious correlations (Birrer,
2005; Johnson, 2013; Kraemer et al., 2011). Fule and
Roddick (2004: 159) suggest operators also have a
responsibility to monitor for ethical impacts of deci-
sion-making by algorithms because ‘‘the sensitivity of
a rule may not be apparent to the miner . . . the ability
to harm or to cause oﬀense can often be inadvertent.’’
Schermer (2011) similarly suggests that data processors
should actively searching for errors and bias in their
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algorithms and models. Human oversight of complex
systems as an accountability mechanism may, however,
be impossible due to the challenges for transparency
already mentioned (see ‘Inscrutable evidence leading
to opacity’ section). Furthermore, humans kept ‘in
the loop’ of automated decision-making may be
poorly equipped to identify problems and take correct-
ive actions (Elish, 2016).
Particular challenges arise for algorithms with
learning capacities, which defy the traditional concep-
tion of designer responsibility. The model requires the
system to be well-deﬁned, comprehensible and predict-
able; complex and ﬂuid systems (i.e. one with count-
less decision-making rules and lines of code) inhibit
holistic oversight of decision-making pathways and
dependencies. Machine learning algorithms are par-
ticularly challenging in this respect (Burrell, 2016;
Matthias, 2004; Zarsky, 2016), seen for instance in
genetic algorithms that program themselves. The trad-
itional model of responsibility fails because ‘‘nobody
has enough control over the machine’s actions to be
able to assume the responsibility for them’’ (Matthias,
2004: 177).
Allen et al. (2006: 14) concur in discussing the need
for ‘machine ethics’: ‘‘the modular design of systems
can mean that no single person or group can fully
grasp the manner in which the system will interact or
respond to a complex ﬂow of new inputs.’’ From trad-
itional, linear programming through to autonomous
algorithms, behavioural control is gradually transferred
from the programmer to the algorithm and its operat-
ing environment (Matthias, 2004: 182). The gap
between the designer’s control and algorithm’s behav-
iour creates an accountability gap (Cardona, 2008)
wherein blame can potentially be assigned to several
moral agents simultaneously.
Related segments of the literature address the ‘ethics
of automation’, or the acceptability of replacing or aug-
menting human decision-making with algorithms (Naik
and Bhide, 2014). Morek (2006) ﬁnds it problematic to
assume that algorithms can replace skilled professionals
in a like-for-like manner. Professionals have implicit
knowledge and subtle skills (cf. Coeckelbergh, 2013;
MacIntyre, 2007) that are diﬃcult to make explicit
and perhaps impossible to make computable (Morek,
2006). When algorithmic and human decision-makers
work in tandem, norms are required to prescribe when
and how human intervention is required, particularly in
cases like high-frequency trading where real-time inter-
vention is impossible before harms occur (Davis et al.,
2013; Raymond, 2014).
Algorithms that make decisions can be considered
blameworthy agents (Floridi and Sanders, 2004a;
Wiltshire, 2015). The moral standing and capacity for
ethical decision-making of algorithms remains a
standout question in machine ethics (e.g. Allen et al.,
2006; Anderson, 2008; Floridi and Sanders, 2004a).
Ethical decisions require agents to evaluate the desir-
ability of diﬀerent courses of actions which present con-
ﬂicts between the interests of involved parties (Allen
et al., 2006; Wiltshire, 2015).
For some, learning algorithms should be considered
moral agents with some degree of moral responsibility.
Requirements for moral agency may diﬀer between
humans and algorithms; Floridi and Sanders (2004b)
and Sullins (2006) argue, for instance, that ‘machine
agency’ requires signiﬁcant autonomy, interactive
behaviour, and a role with causal accountability, to
be distinguished from moral responsibility, which
requires intentionality. As suggested above, moral
agency and accountability are linked. Assigning moral
agency to artiﬁcial agents can allow human stake-
holders to shift blame to algorithms (Crnkovic and
C¸u¨ru¨klu¨, 2011). Denying agency to artiﬁcial agents
makes designers responsible for the unethical behaviour
of their semi-autonomous creations; bad consequences
reﬂect bad design (Anderson and Anderson, 2014;
Kraemer et al., 2011; Turilli, 2007). Neither extreme
is entirely satisfactory due to the complexity of over-
sight and the volatility of decision-making structures.
Beyond the nature of moral agency in machines,
work in machine ethics also investigates how best to
design moral reasoning and behaviours into autono-
mous algorithms as artiﬁcial moral and ethical
agents18 (Anderson and Anderson, 2007; Crnkovic
and C¸u¨ru¨klu¨, 2011; Sullins, 2006; Wiegel and Berg,
2009). Research into this question remains highly rele-
vant because algorithms can be required to make real-
time decisions involving ‘‘diﬃcult trade-oﬀs . . . which
may include diﬃcult ethical considerations’’ without an
operator (Wiegel and Berg, 2009: 234).
Automation of decision-making creates problems of
ethical consistency between humans and algorithms.
Turilli (2007) argues algorithms should be constrained
‘‘by the same set of ethical principles’’ as the former
human worker to ensure consistency within an organ-
isation’s ethical standards. However, ethical principles
as used by human decision-makers may prove diﬃcult
to deﬁne and rendered computable. Virtue ethics is also
thought to provide rule sets for algorithmic decision-
structures which are easily computable. An ideal model
for artiﬁcial moral agents based on heroic virtues is
suggested by Wiltshire (2015), wherein algorithms are
trained to be heroic and thus, moral.19
Other approaches do not require ethical principles to
serve as pillars of algorithmic decision-making frame-
works. Bello and Bringsjord (2012) insist that moral rea-
soning in algorithms should not be structured around
classic ethical principles because it does not reﬂect how
humans actually engage in moral decision-making.
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Rather, computational cognitive architectures – which
allow machines to ‘mind read’, or attribute mental
states to other agents – are required. Anderson and
Anderson (2007) suggest algorithms can be designed to
mimic human ethical decision-making modelled on
empirical research on how intuitions, principles and rea-
soning interact. At a minimum this debate reveals that a
consensus view does not yet exist for how to practically
relocate the social and ethical duties displaced by auto-
mation (Shackelford and Raymond, 2014).
Regardless of the design philosophy chosen,
Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996) argue that developers
have a responsibility to design for diverse contexts ruled
by diﬀerent moral frameworks. Following this, Turilli
(2007) proposes collaborative development of ethical
requirements for computational systems to ground an
operational ethical protocol. Consistency can be con-
ﬁrmed between the protocol (consisting of a decision-
making structure) and the designer’s or organisation’s
explicit ethical principles (Turilli and Floridi, 2009).
Points of further research
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the proposed
map (see ‘Map of the ethics of algorithms’ section) can
be used to organise current academic discourse describ-
ing ethical concerns with algorithms in a principled
way, on purely epistemic and ethical grounds. To
borrow a concept from software development, the
map can remain perpetually ‘in beta’. As new types of
ethical concerns with algorithms are identiﬁed, or if one
of the six described types can be separated into two or
more types, the map can be revised. Our intention has
been to describe the state of academic discourse around
the ethics of algorithms, and to propose an organising
tool for future work in the ﬁeld to bridge linguistic and
disciplinary gaps. Our hope is that the map will
improve the precision of how ethical concerns with
algorithms are described in the future, while also ser-
ving as a reminder of the limitations of merely meth-
odological, technical or social solutions to challenges
raised by algorithms. As the map indicates, ethical con-
cerns with algorithms are multi-dimensional and thus
require multi-dimensional solutions.
While the map provides the bare conceptual struc-
ture we need, it still must be populated as deployment
and critical studies of algorithms proliferate. The seven
themes identiﬁed in the preceding sections identify
where the ‘ethics of algorithms’ currently lies on the
map. With this in mind, in this section we raise a
number of topics not yet receiving substantial attention
in the reviewed literature related to the transformative
eﬀects and traceability of algorithms. These topics can
be considered future directions of travel for the ethics
of algorithms as the ﬁeld expands and matures.
Concerning transformative eﬀects, algorithms
change how identity is constructed, managed and pro-
tected by privacy and data protection mechanisms
(see ‘Transformative eﬀects leading to challenges for
informational privacy’ section). Informational privacy
and identiﬁability are typically closely linked; an indi-
vidual has privacy insofar as she has control over data
and information about her. Insofar as algorithms trans-
form privacy by rendering identiﬁability less important,
a theory of privacy responsive to the reduced import-
ance of identiﬁability and individuality is required.
Van Wel and Royakkers (2004) urge a re-conceptua-
lisation of personal data, where equivalent privacy pro-
tections are aﬀorded to ‘group characteristics’ when
used in place of ‘individual characteristics’ in generat-
ing knowledge about or taking actions towards an indi-
vidual. Further work is required to describe how
privacy operates at group level, absent of identiﬁability
(e.g. Mittelstadt and Floridi, 2016; Taylor et al., 2017).
Real world mechanisms to enforce privacy in analytics
are also required. One proposal mentioned in the
reviewed literature is to develop privacy preserving
data mining techniques which do not require access to
individual and identiﬁable records (Agrawal and
Srikant, 2000; Fule and Roddick, 2004). Related
work is already underway to detect discrimination in
data mining (e.g. Barocas, 2014; Calders and Verwer,
2010; Hajian et al., 2012), albeit limited to detection of
illegal discrimination. Further harm detection mechan-
isms are necessitated by the capacity of algorithms to
disadvantage users in indirect and non-obvious ways
that exceed legal deﬁnitions of discrimination
(Sandvig et al., 2014; Tufekci, 2015). It cannot be
assumed that algorithms will discriminate according
to characteristics observable or comprehensible to
humans.
Concerning traceability, two key challenges for
apportioning responsibility for algorithms remain
under-researched. First, despite a wealth of literature
addressing the moral responsibility and agency of algo-
rithms, insuﬃcient attention has been given to distrib-
uted responsibility, or responsibility as shared across a
network of human and algorithmic actors simultan-
eously (cf. Simon, 2015). The reviewed literature (see
‘Traceability leading to moral responsibility’ section)
addresses the potential moral agency of algorithms,
but does not describe methods and principles for
apportioning blame or responsibility across a mixed
network of human and algorithmic actors.
Second, substantial trust is already placed in algo-
rithms, in some cases aﬀecting a de-responsibilisation of
human actors, or a tendency to ‘hide behind the com-
puter’ and assume automated processes are correct by
default (Zarsky, 2016: 121). Delegating decision-
making to algorithms can shift responsibility away
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from human decision-makers. Similar eﬀects can be
observed in mixed networks of human and information
systems as already studied in bureaucracies, charac-
terised by reduced feelings of personal responsibility
and the execution of otherwise unjustiﬁable actions
(Arendt, 1971). Algorithms involving stakeholders
from multiple disciplines can, for instance, lead to each
party assuming the others will shoulder ethical respon-
sibility for the algorithm’s actions (Davis et al., 2013).
Machine learning adds an additional layer of complexity
between designers and actions driven by the algorithm,
which may justiﬁably weaken blame placed upon the
former. Additional research is needed to understand
the prevalence of these eﬀects in algorithm driven deci-
sion-making systems, and to discern how to minimise the
inadvertent justiﬁcation of harmful acts.
A related problem concerns malfunctioning and
resilience. The need to apportion responsibility is
acutely felt when algorithms malfunction. Unethical
algorithms can be thought of as malfunctioning soft-
ware-artefacts that do not operate as intended. Useful
distinctions exists between errors of design (types) and
errors of operation (tokens), and between the failure to
operate as intended (dysfunction) and the presence of
unintended side-eﬀects (misfunction) (Floridi et al.,
2014). Misfunctioning is distinguished from mere nega-
tive side eﬀects by avoidability, or the extent to which
comparable extant algorithm types accomplish the
intended function without the eﬀects in question.
These distinctions clarify ethical aspects of algorithms
that are strictly related to their functioning, either in the
abstract (for instance when we look at raw perform-
ance), or as part of a larger decision-making system,
and reveals the multi-faceted interaction between
intended and actual behaviour.
Both types of malfunctioning imply distinct respon-
sibilities for algorithm and software developers, users
and artefacts. Additional work is required to describe
fair apportionment of responsibility for dysfunctioning
and misfunctioning across large development teams and
complex contexts of use. Further work is also required to
specify requirements for resilience to malfunctioning as
an ethical ideal in algorithm design. Machine learning in
particular raises unique challenges, because achieving
the intended or ‘‘correct’’ behaviour does not imply
the absence of errors20 (cf. Burrell, 2016) or harmful
actions and feedback loops. Algorithms, particularly
those embedded in robotics, can for instance be made
safely interruptible insofar as harmful actions can be
discouraged without the algorithm being encouraged
to deceive human users to avoid further interruptions
(Orseau and Armstrong, 2016).
Finally, while a degree of transparency is broadly
recognised as a requirement for traceability, how to
operationalise transparency remains an open question,
particularly for machine learning. Merely rendering the
code of an algorithm transparent is insuﬃcient to ensure
ethical behaviour. Regulatory or methodological
requirements for algorithms to be explainable or inter-
pretable demonstrate the challenge data controllers now
face (Tutt, 2016). One possible path to explainability is
algorithmic auditing carried out by data processors
(Zarsky, 2016), external regulators (Pasquale, 2015;
Tutt, 2016; Zarsky, 2016), or empirical researchers
(Kitchin, 2016; Neyland, 2016), using ex post audit stu-
dies (Adler et al., 2016; Diakopoulos, 2015; Kitchin,
2016; Romei and Ruggieri, 2014; Sandvig et al., 2014),
reﬂexive ethnographic studies in development and test-
ing (Neyland, 2016), or reporting mechanisms designed
into the algorithm itself (Vellido et al., 2012). For all
types of algorithms, auditing is a necessary precondition
to verify correct functioning. For analytics algorithms
with foreseeable human impact, auditing can create an
ex post procedural record of complex algorithmic deci-
sion-making to unpack problematic or inaccurate deci-
sions, or to detect discrimination or similar harms.
Further work is required to design broadly applicable,
low impact auditing mechanisms for algorithms (cf.
Adler et al., 2016; Sandvig et al., 2014) that build upon
current work in transparency and interpretability of
machine learning (e.g. Kim et al., 2015; Lou et al., 2013).
All of the challenges highlighted in this review are
addressable in principle. As with any technological
artefact, practical solutions will require cooperation
between researchers, developers and policy-makers.
A ﬁnal but signiﬁcant area requiring further work is
the translation of extant and forthcoming policy applic-
able to algorithms into realistic regulatory mechanisms
and standards. The forthcoming EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in particular is indica-
tive of the challenges to be faced globally in regulating
algorithms.21
The GDPR stipulates a number of responsibilities of
data controllers and rights of data subjects relevant to
decision-making algorithms. Concerning the former,
when undertaking proﬁling controllers will be required
to evaluate the potential consequences of their data-
processing activities via a data protection impact
assessment (Art. 35(3)(a)). In addition to assessing priv-
acy hazards, data controllers also have to communicate
these risks to the persons concerned. According to Art.
13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) data controllers are obligated to
inform the data subjects about existing proﬁling meth-
ods, its signiﬁcance and its envisaged consequences. Art.
12(1) mandates that clear and plain language is used to
inform about these risks.22 Further, Recital 71 states
the data controllers’ obligation to explain the logic of
how the decision was reached. Finally, Art. 22(3) states
the data controller’s duty to ‘‘implement suitable
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and
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freedoms and legitimate interests’’ when automated
decision-making is applied. This obligation is rather
vague and opaque.
On the rights of data subjects, the GDPR generally
takes a self-determination approach. Data subjects are
granted a right to object to proﬁling methods (Art. 21)
and a right not to be subject to solely automated pro-
cessed individual decision-making23 (Art. 22). In these
and similar cases the person concerned either has the
right to object that such methods are used or should at
least have the right to ‘‘obtain human intervention’’ in
order to express their views and to ‘‘contest the deci-
sion’’ (Art. 22(3)).
At ﬁrst glance these provisions defer control to the
data subjects and enable them to decide how their data
are used. Notwithstanding that the GDPR bears great
potential to improve data protection, a number of
exemptions limit the rights of data subjects.24 The
GDPR can be a toothless or a powerful mechanism
to protect data subjects dependent upon its eventual
legal interpretation: the wording of the regulation
allows either to be true. Supervisory authorities and
their future judgments will determine the eﬀectiveness
of the new framework.25 However, additional work is
required in parallel to provide normative guidelines and
practical mechanisms for putting the new rights and
responsibilities into practice.
These are not mundane regulatory tasks. For exam-
ple, the provisions highlighted above can be interpreted
to mean automated decisions must be explainable to data
subjects. Given the connectivity and dependencies of
algorithms and datasets in complex information systems,
and the tendency of errors and biases in data and models
to be hidden over time (see ‘Misguided evidence leading
to bias’ section), ‘explainability’26 may prove particularly
disruptive for data intensive industries. Practical require-
ments will need to be unpacked in the future that strike
an appropriate balance between data subjects’ rights to
be informed about the logic and consequences of proﬁl-
ing, and the burden imposed on data controllers.
Alternatively, it may be necessary to limit automation
or particular analytic methods in particular contexts to
meet transparency requirements speciﬁed in the GDPR
(Tutt, 2016; Zarsky, 2016). Comparable restrictions
already exist in the US Credit Reporting Act, which
eﬀectively prohibits machine learning in credit scoring
because reasons for the denial of credit must be made
available to consumers on demand (Burrell, 2016).
Conclusion
Algorithms increasingly mediate digital life and deci-
sion-making. The work described here has made three
contributions to clarify the ethical importance of this
mediation: (1) a review of existing discussion of ethical
aspects of algorithms; (2) a prescriptive map to organise
discussion; and (3) a critical assessment of the literature
to identify areas requiring further work to develop the
ethics of algorithms.
The review undertaken here was primarily limited to
literature explicitly discussing algorithms. As a result,
much relevant work performed in related ﬁelds is only
brieﬂy touched upon, in areas such as ethics of artiﬁcial
intelligence, surveillance studies, computer ethics and
machine ethics.27 While it would be ideal to summarise
work in all the ﬁelds represented in the reviewed litera-
ture, and thus in any domain where algorithms are in
use, the scope of such as an exercise is prohibitive. We
must therefore accept that there may be gaps in cover-
age for topics discussed only in relation to speciﬁc types
of algorithms, and not for algorithms themselves.
Despite this limitation, the prescriptive map is purpose-
fully broad and iterative to organise discussion around
the ethics of algorithms, both past and future.
Discussion of a concept as complex as ‘algorithm’
inevitably encounters problems of abstraction or
‘talking past each other’ due to a failure to specify a
level of abstraction (LoA) for discussion, and thus limit
the relevant set of observables (Floridi, 2008). A mature
‘ethics of algorithms’ does not yet exist, in part because
‘algorithm’ as a concept describes a prohibitively broad
range of software and information systems. Despite this
limitation, several themes emerged from the literature
that indicate how ethics can coherently be discussed
when focusing on algorithms, independently of
domain-speciﬁc work.
Mapping these themes onto the prescriptive frame-
work proposed here has proven helpful to distinguish
between the kinds of ethical concerns generated by algo-
rithms, which are often muddled in the literature.
Distinct epistemic and normative concerns are often trea-
ted as a cluster. This is understandable, as the diﬀerent
concerns are part of a web of interdependencies. Some of
these interdependencies are present in the literature we
reviewed, like the connection between bias and discrim-
ination (see ‘Misguided evidence leading to bias’ and
‘Unfair outcomes leading to discrimination’ sections) or
the impact of opacity on the attribution of responsibility
(see ‘Inscrutable evidence leading to opacity’ and
‘Traceability leading to moral responsibility’ sections).
The proposed map brings further dependencies into
focus, like the multi-faceted eﬀect of the presence and
absence of epistemic deﬁciencies on the ethical ramiﬁ-
cations of algorithms. Further, the map demonstrates
that solving problems at one level does not address all
types of concerns; a perfectly auditable algorithmic
decision, or one that is based on conclusive, scrutable
and well-founded evidence, can nevertheless cause
unfair and transformative eﬀects, without obvious
ways to trace blame among the network of contributing
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actors. Better methods to produce evidence for some
actions need not rule out all forms of discrimination
for example, and can even be used to discriminate
more eﬃciently. Indeed, one may even conceive of situ-
ations where less discerning algorithms may have fewer
objectionable eﬀects.
More importantly, as already repeatedly stressed in
the above overview, we cannot in principle avoid epi-
stemic and ethical residues. Increasingly better algorith-
mic tools can normally be expected to rule out many
obvious epistemic deﬁciencies, and even help us to
detect well-understood ethical problems (e.g. discrimin-
ation). However, the full conceptual space of ethical
challenges posed by the use of algorithms cannot be
reduced to problems related to easily identiﬁed epistemic
and ethical shortcomings. Aided by the map drawn here,
future work should strive to make explicit the many
implicit connections to algorithms in ethics and beyond.
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Notes
1. We would like to acknowledge valuable comments and
feedback of the reviewers at Big Data & Society.
2. Compare with Turner (2016) on the ontology of programs.
3. For the sake of simplicity, for the remainder of the paper
we will refer generically to ‘algorithms’ rather than con-
structs, implementations and configurations.
4. Tufekci seems to have a similar class of algorithms in mind
in her exploration of detecting harms. She describes ‘gate-
keeping algorithms’ as ‘‘algorithms that do not result in
simple, ‘correct’ answers-instead, I focus on those that are
utilized as subjective decision makers’’ (Tufekci, 2015: 206).
5. The distinction between supervised and unsupervised
learning can be mapped onto analytics to reveal different
ways humans are ‘made sense of’ through data.
Descriptive analytics based on unsupervised learning,
seeks to identify unforeseen correlations between cases to
learn something about the entity or phenomenon. Here,
analysis is exploratory, meaning it lacks a specific
target or hypothesis. In this way, new models and classi-
fications can be defined. In contrast, predictive analytics
based on supervised learning seeks to match cases to pre-
existing classes to infer knowledge about the case.
Knowledge about the assigned classes is used to make
predictions about the case (Van Otterlo, 2013).
6. The term ‘probable knowledge’ is used here in the sense
of Hacking (2006) where it is associated with the emer-
gence of probability and the rise of statistical thinking
(for instance in the context of insurance) that started in
the 17th Century.
7. In mainstream analytic epistemology this issue is con-
nected to the nature of justification, and the importance
of having access to one’s own justifications for a specific
belief (Kornblith, 2001). In the present context, however,
we are concerned with a more interactive kind of justifi-
cation: human agents need to be able to understand how
a conclusion reached by an algorithm is justified in view
of the data.
8. The often blamed opacity of algorithms can only partially
explain why this is the case. Another aspect is more clo-
sely related to the role of re-use in the development of
algorithms and software-artefacts; from the customary
use of existing libraries, to the repurposing of existing
tools and methods for different purposes (e.g. the use of
seismological models of aftershocks in predictive policing
(Mohler et al., 2011), and the tailoring of general tools for
specific methods. Apart from the inevitable distribution
of responsibilities, this highlights the complex relation
between good design (the re-use philosophy promoted
in Structured Programming) and the absence of malfunc-
tion, and reveals that even the designers of software-
artefacts regularly treat part of their work as black
boxes (Sametinger, 1997).
9. See Appendix 1 for information on the methodology,
search terms and query results of the review.
10. A distinction must be made, however, between the ethical
justifiability of acting upon mere correlation and a
broader ethics of inductive reasoning which overlaps
with extant critiques of statistical and quantitative meth-
ods in research. The former concerns the thresholds of
evidence required to justify actions with ethical impact.
The latter concerns a lack of reproducibility in analytics
that distinguishes it in practice from science (cf.
Feynman, 1974; Ioannidis, 2005; Vasilevsky et al., 2013)
and is better understood as an issue of epistemology.
11. Introna and Nissenbaum’s article (2000) is among the
first publications on this topic. The article compares
search engines to publishers and suggests that, like pub-
lishers, search engines filter information according to
market conditions, i.e. according to consumers’ tastes
and preferences, and favour powerful actors. Two cor-
rective mechanisms are suggested: embedding the ‘‘value
of fairness as well as [a] suite of values represented by the
ideology of the Web as a public good’’ (Introna and
Nissenbaum, 2000: 182) in the design of indexing and
ranking algorithms, and transparency of the algorithms
used by search engines. More recently, Zarsky (2013) has
Mittelstadt et al. 15
provided a framework and in-depth legal examination of
transparency in predictive analytics.
12. This is a contentious claim. Bozdag (2013) suggests that
human comprehension has not increased in parallel to the
exponential growth of social data in recent years due to
biological limitations on information processing capaci-
ties. However, this would appear to discount advances in
data visualization and sorting techniques to help humans
comprehend large datasets and information flows (cf.
Turilli and Floridi, 2009). Biological capacities may not
have increased, but the same cannot be said for tool-
assisted comprehension. One’s position on this turns on
whether technology-assisted and human comprehension
are categorically different.
13. The context of autonomous weapon systems is particu-
larly relevant here; see Swiatek (2012).
14. The argument that technology design unavoidably value-
laden is not universally accepted. Kraemer et al. (2011)
provide a counterargument from the reviewed literature.
For them, algorithms are value-laden only ‘‘if one cannot
rationally choose between them without explicitly or
implicitly taking ethical concerns into account.’’ In
other words, designers make value-judgments that
express views ‘‘on how things ought to be or not to be,
or what is good or bad, or desirable or undesirable’’
(Kraemer et al., 2011: 252). For Kraemer et al. (2011),
algorithms that produce hypothetical value-judgments or
recommended courses of action, such as clinical decision
support systems, can be value-neutral because the judg-
ments produced are hypothetical. This approach would
suggest that autonomous algorithms are value-laden by
definition, but only because the judgments produced are
put into action by the algorithm. This conception of value
neutrality appears to suggest that algorithms are designed
in value-neutral spaces, with the designer disconnected
from a social and moral context and history that inevit-
ably influences her perceptions and decisions. It is diffi-
cult to see how this could be the case (cf. Friedman and
Nissenbaum, 1996).
15. Clear sources of discrimination are not consistently iden-
tified in the reviewed literature. Barocas (2014) helpfully
clarifies five possible sources of discrimination related to
biased analytics: (1) inferring membership in a protected
class; (2) statistical bias; (3) faulty inference; (4) overly
precise inferences; and (5) shifting the sample frame.
16. Danna and Gandy (2002) provide a demonstrative exam-
ple in the Royal Bank of Canada which ‘nudged’ cus-
tomers on fee-for-service to flat-fee service packages
after discovering (through mining in-house data) that
customers on the latter offered greater lifetime value to
the bank. Customers unwilling to move to flat-fee services
faced disincentives including higher prices. Through price
discrimination customers were pushed towards options
reflecting the bank’s interests. Customers unwilling to
move were placed into a weak bargaining position in
which they were ‘invited to leave’: losing some customers
in the process of shifting the majority to more profitable
flat-fee packages meant the bank lacked incentive to
accommodate minority interests despite the risk of
losing minority fee-for-service customers to competitors.
17. Data subjects can be considered to have a right to iden-
tity. Such a right can take many forms, but the existence
of some right to identity is difficult to dispute. Floridi
(2011) conceives of personal identity as constituted by
information. Taken as such, any right to informational
privacy translates to a right to identity by default, under-
stood as the right to manage information about the self
that constitutes one’s identity. Hildebrandt and Koops
(2010) similarly recognise a right to form identity without
unreasonable external influence. Both approaches can be
connected to the right to personality derived from the
European Convention on Human Rights.
18. A further distinction can be made between artificial
moral agents and artificial ethical agents. Artificial
moral agents lack true ‘artificial intelligence’ or the capa-
city for reflection required to decide and justify an ethical
course of action. Artificial ethical agents can ‘‘calculate
the best action in ethical dilemmas using ethical prin-
ciples’’ (Moor, 2006) or frameworks derived thereof. In
contrast, artificial morality requires only that machines
act ‘as if’ they are moral agents, and thus make ethically
justified decisions according to pre-defined criteria
(Moor, 2006). The construction of artificial morality
is seen as the immediate and imminently achievable
challenge for machine ethics, as it does not first require
artificial intelligence (Allen et al., 2006). With that said,
the question of whether ‘‘it is possible to create artificial
full ethical agents’’ continues to occupy machine ethicists
(Tonkens, 2012: 139).
19. Tonkens (2012) however argues that agents embedded
with virtue-based frameworks would find their creation
ethically impermissible due to the impoverished sense of
virtues a machine could actually develop. In short, the
character development of humans and machines are too
dissimilar to compare. He predicts that unless autono-
mous agents are treated as full moral agents comparable
to humans, existing social injustices will be exacerbated as
autonomous machines are denied the freedom to express
their autonomy by being forced into service of the needs
of the designer. This concern points to a broader issue in
machine ethics concerning whether algorithms and
machines with decision-making autonomy will continue
to be treated as passive tools as opposed to active (moral)
agents (Wiegel and Berg, 2009).
20. Except for trivial cases, the presence of false positives and
false negatives in the work of algorithms, particularly
machine learning, is unavoidable.
21. It is important to note that this regulation even applies to
data controllers or processors that are not established
within the EU, if the monitoring (including predicting
and profiling) of behaviour is focused on data subjects
that are located in the EU (Art 3(2)(b) and Recital 24).
22. In cases where informed consent is required, Art. 7(2)
stipulates that non-compliance with Art. 12(1) renders
given consent not legally binding.
23. Recital 71 explains that solely automated individual deci-
sion-making has to be understood as a method ‘‘which
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly
significantly affects him or her, such as automatic refusal
of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices
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without any human intervention’’ and includes profiling
that allows to ‘‘predict aspects concerning the data sub-
ject’s performance at work, economic situation, health,
personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour,
location or movements.’’
24. Art. 21(1) explains that the right to object to profiling
methods can be restricted ‘‘if the controller demonstrates
compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which
override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data
subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of
legal claims.’’ In addition, Art. 23(1) stipulates that the
rights enshrined in Art. 12 to 22 – including the right to
object to automated decision-making – can be restricted
in cases such as ‘‘national security, defence; public secur-
ity;(. . .); other important objectives of general public
interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular
an important economic or financial interest of the Union
or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and
taxation a matters, public health and social security; (. . .);
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution
of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (...);’’. As
a result, these exemptions also apply to the right to access
(Art. 15 – the right to obtain information if personal data
are being processed) as well as the right to be forgotten
(Art. 17).
25. Art. 83(5)(b) invests supervisory authorities with the
power to impose fines up to 4% of the total worldwide
annual turnover in cases where rights of the data subjects
(Art. 12 to 22) have been infringed. This lever can be used
to enforce compliance and to enhance data protection.
26. ‘Explainability’ is preferred here to ‘interpretability’ to
highlight that the explanation of a decision must be com-
prehensible not only to data scientists or controllers, but
to the lay data subjects (or some proxy) affected by the
decision.
27. The various domains of research and development
described here share a common characteristic: all make
use of computing algorithms. This is not, however, to
suggest that complex fields such as machine ethics
and surveillance studies are subsumed by the ‘ethics of
algorithms’ label. Rather, each domain has issues which
do not originate in the design and functionality of the
algorithms being used. These issues would thus not be
considered part of an ‘ethics of algorithms’, despite the
inclusion of the parent field. ‘Ethics of algorithms’ is thus
not meant to replace existing fields of enquiry, but rather
to identify issues shared across a diverse number
of domains stemming from the computing algorithms
they use.
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